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The Online/Offline Cognitive Divide: Implications for Law 
Brian Christopher Jones 
 
While the online and offline realms continue to converge, this piece argues that a 
significant cognitive divide remains. This is especially the case as regards the use of 
social media. The structural mechanisms of these platforms encourage (and even 
propel) speech, which facilitates a unique cognitive environment for users; an 
atmosphere where individuals tend to be much more likely to engage in speech than in 
the physical realm. Many argue that such disinhibition is due to anonymity, but 
research has demonstrated that it is a more complex picture than previously believed. 
For the most part the law has ignored these distinct online characteristics, treating 
speech over social media as if it were “café” or “pub talk”. In fact most of the current 
UK legislation used to regulate speech over the internet, including of course speech 
over social media, was enacted before these neoteric services came into existence. 
While prosecution guidelines throughout the UK have been updated to include social 
media considerations, it is highly debateable as to whether they have proven effective 
in recognising social media as a unique cognitive environment. And although policies 
based around technological neutrality remain increasingly attractive to law-makers, 
especially as the online and offline realms become less distinct, it is important to 
remember that law cannot properly operate based on such real or perceived 
eventualities. 
 
DOI: 10.2966/scrip.130116.83 
 
 © Brian C. Jones 2016. This work is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Licence. Please click on the link to read the terms and conditions. 
 
                                                 
 Lecturer in Public Law, Liverpool Hope University, brianchristopherjones@gmail.com. The author 
wishes to thank Dr Kay Goodall for her plethora of insightful comments on this paper, in addition to 
the beneficial comments of an anonymous reader.  
(2016) 13:1 SCRIPTed 
 
84 
 
1. Introduction 
When it comes to speech, many of us could have split personalities; no, not in the 
clinical sense, of course, but in terms of how we interact online and offline. A variety 
of research demonstrates that individuals behave differently in these two realms: 
many people tend to be more forthcoming with information in the virtual world, as 
opposed to more traditional, “everyday” interactions.1 Although a colleague or 
acquaintance may seem bashful in person, their Twitter or Facebook feed could reveal 
a different side of their personality. The implications of this divide for law are 
substantial. A significant amount of public speech, which may have previously been a 
matter for public squares or speakers’ corners—or perhaps more importantly, may 
have been reserved for the private realm or not uttered at all—has shifted online. 
Although much has been written about how the internet has affected public speech,2 
little of it grapples with differences in persons’ online/offline behaviour, in addition to 
the structure within which this speech occurs. Because law-makers in many 
jurisdictions have embraced the idea of “technological neutrality”3—a belief that laws 
and rules for behaviours in both the online/offline realms should be equivalent—
arguments for any online/offline discrepancies are sometimes pushed aside. But such 
differences carry enormous implications for law. This article first examines the unique 
structure by which speech over social media occurs. It then discusses how this 
structure leads to an online/offline cognitive divide, and closes by considering some 
of its implications for law. While this article generally discusses social networking 
sites (SNSs), it acknowledges the variety of SNSs available. Many of these sites differ 
significantly in terms of the way that they are used, the way they operate, and in their 
levels of public/private information. While some SNSs are inherently private 
(Whatsapp) others lie in-between public and private (Facebook) or are fully 
searchable (Twitter). And although these variations are indeed significant, it is not 
within the remit of this paper to explore such differences.  
2. The Structural Context of Social Media Speech 
Social media providers encourage users to disclose information about themselves, to 
form relationships online and to enhance personal status through colourful self-
expression. But the providers do not merely encourage this: they propel users towards 
it and they sideline those who resist. The mechanisms they use enable the providers to 
                                                 
1 See inter alia, GS Mesch and G Beker, “Are norms of disclosure of online and offline personal 
information associated with the disclosure of personal information online?” (2010) 36(4) Human 
Communication Research 570; AN Joinson and CB Paine, “Self-disclosure, privacy and the Internet”, 
in AN Joinson, KYA McKenna, T Postmes and UD Reips, The Oxford Handbook of Internet 
Psychology (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 240; J Suler, “The online disinhibition effect” (2004) 7(3) 
CyberPsychology & Behavior 321. 
2 See, e.g., D Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (New York: 
NYU Press, 2004); D Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor and Privacy on the Internet 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  
3 C Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement” (2010) 18(3) International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology 248; C Reed, “Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality” 
(2007) 4(3) SCRIPTed 264.  
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exploit fundamental cognitive biases that encourage self-disclosure. Law in Britain 
fails to recognise this, regulating instead the individual whose speech crosses over 
into transgressive behaviour such as hate speech or threats, rather than regulating the 
criminogenic structures that may give rise to such speech.  
Too often, legal debate about harmful behaviour on social media focuses on the 
individual actor.4 What is insufficiently recognised is that commercial providers of 
social networking services incentivise people to communicate in ways that express 
their personal identities and disclose personal information—to become the 
“transparent human”5—because providers can monetarise this data.6 But providers not 
only incentivise this disclosure: they impose sanctions on those who refuse to engage 
in these ways, by excluding them from free or subsidised services. Users are 
motivated to self-disclose7 through inducements that range from the hedonic (such as 
customisable personal spaces)8 to the exclusionary (the requirement that data be 
released in order to authenticate your identity, join an online community, or filter 
marketing offers).9 Disclosure in itself is not necessarily unattractive to users who 
desire to build public profiles:10 rather the problem lies with the persistence of the 
data, the lack of control and the potential for its aggregation.  
The rules of participation and popularity on social media encourage people to express 
themselves briefly (emoticons, character limits), rapidly and often (quick posting, 
informality in grammar and spelling) and with flair (wit, flirting). Indeed, the 
abbreviated length of statements and the time between receipt and transmission is 
central, not incidental, to some forms of social media interaction. One of the keys to 
“success” on Twitter is jumping into the fray fast enough that your tweets are seen at 
the height of interest in a topic. Debate tends to focus on the risks posed by brevity 
(the maximum of 140 characters in a tweet), but it has not given sufficient attention to 
rapidity. Naomi Baron’s work on instant messaging (IM) language and SMSs 
concluded that the average length of IM statements is akin to a face-to-face chat, but 
that the frequency of transmissions between one party and the other was, she found, 
longer than expected, because users are often multitasking while using such 
services.11 Baron also found that in both IM and SMSs a number of lexical 
                                                 
4 A recent example of this is a parliamentary report: HL Select Committee on Communications, Social 
Media and Criminal Offences 1st Report of Session 2014-15 HL (2014) 37. 
5 B Berendt, O Günther and S Spiekermann, “Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual 
Behaviour” (2005) 48(4) Communications of the ACM 101, 101. 
6 J Van Dijck et al, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford: OUP, 
2013), 14-18 and also for a Marxist analysis see C Fuchs, Culture and Economy in the Age of Social 
Media (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), ch. 4. 
7 H Krasnova, S Spiekermann, K Koroleva and T Hildebrand, “Online social networks: why we 
disclose” (2010) 25(2) Journal of Information Technology 109.  
8
 P-Y Pai and DC Arnott, “User adoption of social networking sites: Eliciting uses and gratifications 
through a means–end approach” (2013) 29(3) Computers in Human Behavior 1039, 1047-1048.  
9 Joinson and Paine, see note 1 above, at 238.  
10 Z Tufekci, “Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online Social Network 
Sites” (2008) 28(1) Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 20. 
11 N Baron, Always On (Oxford: OUP 2008) 57.  
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shortenings are used and punctuation is typically disregarded.12 All such time-saving 
strategies have remained a feature of microblogging, SMSs and other messaging 
platforms, and encourage, even compel users to make unqualified statements with 
little time for forethought (although some SNSs may compel more speech than others 
in this regard). These all amount to structural pressures which, if resisted, reduce the 
user’s chance of successful participation. 
Speech over social media is also a heavily nuanced endeavour that often goes beyond 
traditional text. Neoteric textual devices such as emoticons (including auditory 
emoticons, conveyed by snippets of music) and sentence-replacement “stickers”13 
came to the fore in the Sally Bercow case.14 An *innocent face* emoticon that 
Bercow tweeted indicated to the court a defamatory accusation of paedophilia because 
its sardonic tone helped establish the intent behind her tweet.15 Meanwhile, the range 
and depth of emoticons and other icons such as stickers are growing16 (see messaging 
services such as WhatsApp, Line, and Facebook). 
The potential impact of all this is of course heightened by permanence and 
searchability. These features enable individual minor acts of questionable behaviour, 
even over many years and places, to be brought together one day by someone else, to 
create a composite of statements with a more serious impact, where nuance is lost. 
Context is also lost: a user can engage in many different layers of interaction within a 
forum, and users are usually only posting to a selected, customisable group of friends 
or acquaintances. Even on Twitter, where everything is searchable, tweets are (often) 
only seen by those “following” them.17 Such levels further muddle the distinction 
between public and private expression. Both the English guidelines and the Scottish 
guidance on social media prosecutions do treat intention not to communicate to a 
wide audience as relevant, although not decisive.18 
 
                                                 
12 Ibid, at 152-160.  
13 H Tabuchi, “No Time to Text? Say It With Stickers” (25 May 2014) New York Times, B1, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/26/technology/no-time-to-text-apps-turn-to-stickers.html?_r=0 
(accessed 27 April 2016). 
14 Lord McAlpine of West Green v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342. Sally Bercow is the wife of the 
Speaker of the House of Commons. On this, see P Bernal “A defence of responsible tweeting” (2014) 
Communications Law 12. 
15 J Agate, “McAlpine, the Attorney General and the Defamation Act – social media accountability in 
2013” (2013) 24(7) Entertainment Law Review 235.  
16 Tabuchi, see note 13 above. 
17 All tweets are searchable unless the user has selected to make their tweets private. In particular, if 
hashtags are added to tweets (#), others can easily trace all the tweets containing that hashtag. 
18 Crown Prosecution Service guidelines,  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/ (accessed 27 April 
2016). Scottish guidance, p. 9 
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Book_of_Regulations/Fina
l%20version%2026%2011%2014.pdf (accessed 27 April 2016).   
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3. The Online/Offline Cognitive Divide 
There may come a time when the separation between the online and offline worlds is 
indistinct, and that may indeed be what some technology/social networking 
companies desire: a harmonious connection between the physical and virtual world. 
Some scholars have argued that these worlds are already becoming indistinct: John 
Inazu notes the “dynamic line” between the virtual and non-virtual,19 and Klaus 
Jensen concludes that after being regarded as “an extraordinary cyberspace”, the 
“Internet has been going through a process of becoming ordinary”.20 Andrew Murray 
even notes that “[p]eople treat SNPs [social networking providers] like private 
conversations and do all the things they normally would in private discussion with 
friends”.21 Indeed, there is little doubt that the online world is “entirely real” 22; so real 
that many activities previously performed offline (dating, shopping, even getting an 
education) can now be performed online. Yet the newfound harmony between 
online/offline activities is often at odds with the distinct behavioural differences seen 
online, as opposed to offline. 
It is also important to understand the cognitive aspects of these developments, which 
again are not necessarily matters of reckless character, but are fundamental human 
characteristics. Although they may be becoming more intertwined as technology 
advances, there remains a sufficiently strong case against the presumption that the 
physical and virtual worlds mimic one another. The online disinhibition effect, 
including but also beyond the important aspect of anonymity, provides evidence that 
there are distinct behavioural patterns and norms exhibited online. There are also 
fundamental differences in the mechanisms people use to establish online and offline 
trust.  
Initial research in this area focused on human-computer interaction as a relationship 
between human and machine.23 Now, with the omnipresence (in most developed 
nations) of the internet and social media, research is focusing on the machine as being 
an intermediary, as the physical and virtual worlds gradually blend into one another. 
Yet over the past two decades a significant body of empirical research has found that 
people are more uninhibited online than in face-to-face communications.24 A 
significant, if not disproportionate, part of the discussion regarding online speech 
revolves around the concept of “anonymity”, including extensive discussion about 
how it should be dealt with by the courts.25 Many commentators believe this to be the 
                                                 
19 J Inazu, “Virtual Assembly” (2013) 98(5) Cornell Law Review 1093, 1112.  
20 K Jensen, “New Media, Old Methods – Internet Methodologies and the Online/Offline Divide”, in 
Consalvo and Ess (eds) The Handbook of Internet Studies (Oxford: Wiley, 2011), 47  
21 A Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (2nd ed)(Oxford: OUP, 2013), 138.  
22 SA Golder and MW Macy, “Digital Footprints: Opportunities and Challenges for Online Social 
Research” (2014) 40 Annual Review of Sociology 129, 143.  
23 A Light and I Wakeman, “Beyond the interface: users” perceptions of interaction and audience on 
websites” (2001) 13(3) Interacting with Computers 325, 326. 
24 AN Joinson, “Disinhibition and the Internet”, in Gackenbach (ed.) Psychology and the Internet: 
Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Transpersonal Implications (San Diego: Academic Press, 2007), 76.  
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driving factor behind toxic (internet) disinhibition. I disagree, and hope to provide 
more context to this important discussion.  
A distinct “disinhibition effect”, outside the parameters of anonymity, has been found 
by many. Gustavo Mesch and Guy Beker conclude that “it appears that the tendency 
to disclose more personal information online is not restricted to communication 
purposes and is common in any online behavior”.26 Researchers and journalists often 
refer to this as the “Gyges effect”. Such evidence has been found in a range of studies 
examining chat rooms, survey responses, emailing and many other situations.27 Some 
users have even reported an “online self” and an “offline self”, maintaining that these 
iterations are vastly different from one another.28 Others believe the norms and values 
of the offline world do not transfer to the online world.29 Azy Barak and Liat Hen 
observe:  
The online disinhibition effect is assumed to be a product of several 
psychological factors that operate in cyberspace and have a great impact on 
people’s behavior. The main factors are considered to be anonymity, 
invisibility, lack of eye contact, neutralization of people’s status, 
asynchronicity as a major road block of communication, and textuality of 
communication. As a result of these factors, expressed dynamically but whose 
relative powers and directions are still to be empirically determined, an 
individual goes through a disinhibition process, whereby behaviors (including 
verbal expressions) not normally displayed in the physical environment, or not 
as intensively or prevalently, are expressed and become more frequent on the 
Internet.30  
Microblogging social media in particular has received a large amount of criticism 
regarding its potentially toxic effects. A prominent example of this was the reaction to 
Caroline Criado-Perez and MP Stella Creasy as regards women on British bank notes. 
Criado-Perez’s successful campaign was met with overwhelming hostility, in which 
users reacted negatively and sometimes violently: some made rape threats while 
others were explicitly misogynistic.31 After Creasy defended Criado-Perez, she was 
met with similar threats, even death threats. She was sent a picture of a masked man 
                                                                                                                                            
25 See, e.g., B Murchison, “Anonymous speech on the internet”, in D Hunter, R Lobato, M 
Richardsom, and J Thomas (eds) Amateur Media: Social, Cultural and Legal Perspectives (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2013), 187.  
26 Mesch and Beker, see note 1 above, at 572.  
27 Joinson and Paine, see note 1 above, at 240. 
28 Suler, see note 1 above, at 324-325. 
29 Mesch and Beker, note 1 above, at 574, citing H Rheingold, The Virtual Community (Cambridge: 
MIT, 1993).  
30 A Barak and L Hen, “Exposure in cyberspace as means of enhancing psychological assessment”, in 
A. Barak (ed), Psychological Aspects of Cyberspace: Theory, Research, Applications (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2008) 135.  
31 The Guardian, “Two jailed for Twitter abuse of feminist campaigner” (24 January 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/24/two-jailed-twitter-abuse-feminist-campaigner 
(accessed 27 April 2016). 
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brandishing a knife, and also received threats that she was going to be beheaded.32 Of 
course, none of these threats came from face to face communication; all were 
delivered pseudonymously via Twitter. Yet such toxic behaviour may not arise merely 
because of anonymity or pseudoanonymity. For example, Lapidot-Lefler and Barak 
have found that a lack of eye-contact, not anonymity or invisibility, was the “chief 
contributor to the negative [toxic] effects of online disinhibition”.33 This further 
highlights that the structural aspects of such communication could have much more 
influence than previously thought. Indeed, lifting many of the “geographical and 
temporal constraints of face-to-face communication”34 has not happened seamlessly, 
and thus may require more time for norms to develop and certainly further 
understanding by the law.  
Although anonymity and invisibility have (perhaps mistakenly) dominated the 
disinhibition debate,35 researchers have also explored whether different norms of 
disinhibition/disclosure are displayed online and offline. Comparing a large sample of 
American adolescents, Mesch and Beker found that computer-mediated 
communication produces a noticeable generative effect. In particular, “[n]orms of 
offline identity information disclosure were not related to norms of online identity 
disclosure, indicating that they are not associated with online behavior”.36 Ultimately, 
the researchers concluded that, “online realms in general and CMC (computer 
mediated communication) in particular constitute a separate normative realm”.37 This 
finding supports my position that the online world, although abundantly connected to 
the physical world, is a social space in its own right. Mesch further argues that “online 
behavior is conceived as different and even separate from one’s offline norms and 
motivations…. some Internet attributes such as the lack of cues, controllability and 
anonymity provide individuals with the opportunity to disclose more intimate and 
personal information”. 38 Far from knowing less about others online, we may learn 
what was once the sort of information shared only with a person’s closest confidantes, 
if at all. Supporting their arguments about the continuum of obscurity, Hartzog and 
Stutzman point out that human cognitive groups have historically been far smaller 
than the groups of associates in online life, and that obscurity has thus hitherto been 
the norm.39 
                                                 
32 A Topping and B Quinn, “Stella Creasy receives Twitter photo of masked, knife-wielding man” (6 
August 2013),  The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/06/stella-
creasy-twitter-photo-masked-man-knife (accessed 27 April 2016).  
33 N Lapidot-Lefler and A Barak, “Effects of anonymity, invisibility, and lack of eye-contact on toxic 
online disinhibition” (2012) 28 Computers in Human Behavior 434.  
34 Golder and Macy, see note 22 above, at 143.  
35 EE Hollenbaugh and MK Everett, “The Effects of Anonymity on Self-Disclosure in Blogs: An 
Application of the Online Disinhibition Effect” (2013) 18(3) Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 283.  
36 Mesch and Beker, see note 1 above, at 588.  
37 ibid. 
38
 GS Mesch, “Is online trust and trust in social institutions associated with online disclosure of 
identifiable information online?” (2012) 28(4) Computers in Human Behavior 1471, 1476.  
39 Hartzog and Stutzman, “The Case for Online Obscurity” (2013) 101(1) California Law Review 1, 6.  
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Georg Simmel long ago observed that trust is “one of the most important synthetic 
forces within society”,40 and this is also present in virtual worlds. Trust among one’s 
friends or “followers” is also a key issue in understanding how individuals behave 
over SNSs, as is the generalised trust users invest in the wider online world. Trust 
over the internet and SNSs in particular involves two distinct but inter-related levels: 
(i) the trust of one’s online friends, acquaintances or followers, and (ii) trust in the 
service provider or company that the user is revealing information to. Regarding the 
latter, Gordon and Macy note that a growing body of research finds anonymising or 
encrypting data insufficient for protecting privacy.41 If privacy considerations are lost 
to the monetarisation of data, this finding is especially troublesome, and something 
the law should take into consideration. It should also not be forgotten that “good 
business practices have important ramifications for the long-term well-being of 
societies”, including virtual ones.42 Regarding the former, opportunities for 
misperception among users already created by the very low level of social cues online 
are worsened by a phenomenon familiar to psychologists: the false-consensus effect43: 
that people tend to overestimate the extent to which others share their perceptions of 
the social world. This cognitive bias has been found to affect a huge range of 
perceptions from ethics and values to interpretations of everyday events, and 
unsurprisingly has also been found on the internet.44 Nevertheless, trust remains an 
interconnected issue affected by a range of other elements.  
There is also a gap between actual privacy on social media and perceived notions of 
privacy that contributes to the disinhibition considered above. Howard Rheingold has 
observed that the internet brings a “decentering of place”;45 Inazu calls it “presence 
without physicality”.46 Scholars have found that people commonly have a heightened 
sense of concern regarding their privacy, but often do not take the necessary steps to 
protect it.47 Novice SNS users are likely to take a cautious approach early on, and 
reveal more as they increasingly use the service. This is understandable given that in 
many respects, engagement in social media is a highly private endeavour. People post 
in their homes on personal computers, on their phones, pads or other devices, and 
have personalised pages48 for most of their social media sites. But speaker location (in 
terms of physical presence of the user/speaker), which is a key aspect of traditional 
                                                 
40 KH Wolf, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950), 318.  
41 Golder and Macy, see note 22 above, at 141. 
42 Muntz, “Effects of Internet Commerce on Social Trust (2009) 73(3) Public Opinion Quarterly 439, 
455.  
43 Marks and Miller, “Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical 
review” (1987) 102(1) Psychological Bulletin 72. 
44 Wojcieszak, “False Consensus Goes Online: Impact of Ideologically Homogenous Groups on False 
Consensus” (2008) 72(4) Public Opinion Quarterly 781.  
45 H Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Cambridge: MIT 
Press 1993), 349.  
46 Inazu, see note 19 above, at 1108.  
47
 YJ Park, SW Campbell and N Kwak, “Affect, cognition and reward: Predictors of privacy protection 
online” (2012) 28(3) Computers in Human Behavior 1019, 1020.  
48
 Pai & Arnott, see note 8 above, at 1047-1048. 
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public discourse, is a lesser feature in online speech—until one crosses the indistinct 
borders of legality.  
4. Implications for the Law  
The cognitive divide between the online/offline worlds suggests that “cyberspace [is] 
a psychologically unique social environment. People, in general, behave in it more 
freely and more openly than in their offline, physical environment[s]”.49 Indeed there 
appears to be a “natural human tendency to treat cyberspace” differently, as a place 
where standards of behaviour may change from the physical world.50 Thus the norms 
and values of the offline world do not easily translate to online platforms. Yet many 
individuals have been convicted of offences involving what Rowbottom would define 
as low-level speech: “amateur content that is spontaneous, inexpensive to produce and 
is often akin to everyday conversation”.51 Low-level speech can be threatening, target 
individuals for harassment or be grossly offensive. However it may also be less 
serious and merit a lesser response, being of the sort that would previously (being 
expressed verbally) not have attracted criminal censure.  
American jurists have offered a constructive critique of the traditional distinction 
made between high and low-value speech (which depends on whether the speech 
engages with matters of democratic importance).52 Rowbottom has argued that a 
greater distinction in Britain should be made between high and low-level speech 
(examining whether or not it is “professionally produced, aimed at a wide audience … 
well-resourced and researched in advance”53). Judgments about low-level speech 
should focus less on the benefit to the audience and more on the right of the speaker 
to participate in democratic communication.54 There is concern about whether the 
CPS, and others, are respecting these thresholds.55  
                                                 
49 Barak and Hen, see note 30 above, at 135.  
50 Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence”, see note 3 above, at 253. Although, Reed’s ultimate 
message here advocates equivalence, in that “[t]he standards to which such [online] actors will be held 
to are to be broadly the same as the standards offline”.   
51 J Rowbottom, “To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech” (2012) 71(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 355, 357.  
52 See for instance R Post “The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell” (1990) 103(3) Harvard Law Review 603; 
CL Estlund “Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment 
Category” (1990) 59(1) George Washington Law Review 1; F Schauer “The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience” (2004) 117(6) Harvard Law 
Review 1765. 
53 Rowbottom, see note 51 above, 357. 
54 J Rowbottom “In the Shadow of the Big Media: Freedom of Expression, Participation and the 
Production of Knowledge Online” (2014) PL 491, 495. 
55 See e.g., D Bunting, “Jake Newsome – Another social media jailing over an Ann Maguire posting”, 
UK Criminal Law Blog (4 June 2014), available at http://ukcriminallawblog.com/jake-newsome-
another-tweeter-jailed-for-ann-maguire-posting/ (accessed 27 April 2016); see also L Harris, 
“Defendant who told judge ‘suck my cock’ on Facebook to be re-sentenced”, UK Criminal Law Blog 
(16 Feb 2016), available at http://ukcriminallawblog.com/defendant-who-told-judge-suck-my-cock-on-
facebook-to-be-re-sentenced/ (accessed 27 April 2016).  
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Other scholars have remarked on the need for the law to be illuminated by deeper 
understanding and analysis when it comes to new technologies and social media. 
McGoldrick writes:  
The rapid evolution of SNSs certainly demands imaginative and informed re-
thinking about their legal regulation. In legal terms communicating via SNSs 
is clearly not the equivalent of oral conversations with friends in a cafe, a bar 
or a public house. There is a permanent written record. There is also a 
potentially much wider audience…56 
Nevertheless the misconceived café/pub talk analogy seems to have taken hold among 
the judiciary. Rowbottom cites several examples of judges analogising online 
comments to different forms of casual speech, such as “chatting in a bar”, “pub talk” 
and “saloon-bar moanings”.57 Rather than considering inherent differences in online 
and offline communication, judges have drawn from pre-existing notions of discourse 
that align with the technological-neutral arguments noted above. Thus we have not yet 
seen the fundamental legal innovations needed to deal with the internet, and social 
media in particular. This is especially problematic given social media users’ minimal 
control over the destinations of their statements. As McGoldrick has observed, “[t]he 
line between individual and small group communication on one side and mass 
communication on the other is gradually fading”.58 When people engage in abusive 
speech online, they therefore face criminal prosecution, sanctions by their employer, 
widespread public exposure and shaming and/or being excluded from SNSs. They 
may seek to defend themselves by arguing that they believed the space to be private, 
but law accords them little right of privacy (beyond the minimal amount of protection 
offered by the due process principle in criminal procedural law). They may seek to 
assert their right to obscurity (having embarrassing or misleading data deleted), but 
mostly law does not provide this either.59  
                                                 
56 D McGoldrick “The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: A 
UK Perspective” (2013) 13(1) Human Rights Law Review 150. My emphasis.  
57 See the cases cited in Rowbottom, note 51 above, at 377. Academics in the US have also done this. 
See BJ Linnekin, ““Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause: Tracing the First 
Amendment”s Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial Taverns” (2012) 39(3) Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 593.  
58 McGoldrick, see note 56 above, at 151. He goes on to observe:  
[s]o too is the line between individual communications and those by organisations and 
institutions. It is not really credible to apply the high standards of journalism and 
broadcasting imposed by human rights law on mass communication organisation and 
institutions to individuals. The law will have to adapt. This will happen both in terms of 
substantive law and remedies that afford effective legal protection. 
59 Especially now that it is so easy to take screenshots on any type of device that operate SNSs. And 
while the “right to be forgotten” ruling (Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, C-131/12 (13 May 2014)) does allow for certain 
information/stories not to arise on search engines, it sometimes does not delete that information from 
the original sources (e.g., in the case of a news story on a newspaper website, which may still carry the 
work, even though the search engine will not include such an article in its results). This is because the 
right to privacy must be balanced with the right to freedom of expression. However, in most cases 
regarding SNSs it does allow for users to request full deletion of their personal data located on such 
services.  
(2016) 13:1 SCRIPTed 
 
93 
The main traditional right individuals could draw upon is the right to freedom of 
expression. But this right is available only in forums that are designated as public 
space, or where a person is engaging in protected speech such as political expression. 
Almost all online forums are pseudo-public space, because they are corporately 
owned and there is no concept of the online Speaker’s Corner,60 the protected public 
forum online where speech by minor figures may be heard in passing by a significant 
proportion of citizens. And although the European Court of Human Rights has 
acknowledged that “the Internet has now become one of the principal means by which 
individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information”,61 it has yet 
to define major SNSs as public forums. Some jurisdictions have (rightly) begun 
implementing constitutional protections regarding the internet. The German Federal 
Court of Justice and French Conseil constitutionnel have held that there is a 
fundamental right of access to the internet.62 I have previously argued that even 
though social media has gone through periods of being seen as “democracy-
enforcing” and “rights-infringing”, it could eventually be recognised as a human right, 
given that it touches on the important freedoms of expression, association and 
information.63 But such recognition would also have to appreciate its distinctive 
characteristics.   
4. Conclusion 
The structural and cognitive aspects of social media use should not be lost on the law. 
Policies advocating online/offline equivalence are certain to be important going 
forward,64 especially as the two realms become more intertwined and less distinct. But 
law cannot properly operate based on such real or perceived eventualities; after all, 
and most significantly, law governs the present.  Users of SNSs are structurally 
compelled into engaging in speech—sometimes harmful speech. And indeed 
researchers have found that, outside of mere anonymity, the cognitive aspects of the 
online realm produces a unique environment, where individuals divulge more than 
they do in the physical realm. The law has not accounted for these characteristics, 
often treating such speech as “pub talk” or other casual speech; and given the 
                                                 
60 As Noveck observed, there is “no Central Park in cyberspace” (BS Noveck, “Designing Deliberative 
Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-lawyer” (2003) 9 Boston University Journal of 
Science and Technology Law 1, 24). 
61 Yildirim v Turkey ECtHR (18 December 2012). 
62 G Moody, “German Court Recognizes That An Internet Connection Is Now Indispensable For 
Modern Life”, Tech Dirt (25 Jan 2013), available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130125/07585121787/german-court-recognizes-that-internet-
connection-is-now-indispensable-modern-life.shtml (accessed 27 April 2016); N Lucchi, “Access to 
Network Services and Protection of Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet 
Access for the Freedom of Expression” (2011) 19(3) Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 645; see also the discussion of professional media outlets in T Kenyon “Assuming 
Free Speech” (2014) 77(3) MLR 379, 391-393. 
63 BC Jones, “Is Social Media a Human Right? Exploring the Scope of Internet Rights”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog (5 Dec 2014), available at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/12/is-social-media-a-human-right-exploring-the-scope-of-internet-
rights/ (accessed 27 April 2016).  
64 See, e.g., Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence”, note 3 above.  
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difficulties in keeping up with technology, legal regulation of it is often hopelessly out 
of date. As a 2014 Lords Communications Committee report noted when discussing 
social media prosecution options, even though the Director of Public Prosecutions has 
issued “clear and accessible” guidelines on social media prosecutions, most of the 
laws being used to prosecute such cases “pre-date the invention of social media”.65 
These legal “adaptations”—presumably based around notions of technological 
neutrality and online/offline equivalence—appear to have been the preferred method 
for prosecutors, judges and lawmakers, but they are certainly not the “imaginative and 
informed re-thinking” that McGoldrick suggested.66 Should the legal establishment 
ever take on such a complicated and multifaceted project, the structural and cognitive 
characteristics of social media—and the internet more generally—must be taken into 
consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Lords Social Media and Criminal Offences Report, see note 4 above, at 7. And further, the report 
thought that this was acceptable.  
66 McGoldrick, see note 56 above.  
